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Many researchers attribute the problems of economic stagnation and
environmental degradation prevailing in Africa today, to local institutional
constraints. Because customary land tenure systems usually do not confer
individual titles or use rights and lack active land markets, they argue, these
systems discourage efficient resource use by hindering land transactions and
factor mobility. Another hypothesis put forward is that land tenure
influences agricultural productivity through the security effect (or investment
demand effect), whereby uncertainty of the user’s claim to land lessens
expected future returns to current investments in land improvement. Yet
another line ofargument is that land title can stimulate investment by means
of the collateral effect (or credit supply effect) by turning land into a
commodity that can be mortgaged and transferred and that farmers can use
to acquire credit.
Existing empirical studies have failed to establish strong links between
land rights, investment and agricultural productivity in African farming
systems. This study tries to fill part of this gap in knowledge by
investigating whether traditional land tenure systems are an impediment to
allocative efficiency in agriculture in Niger. In view of the absence of
registration, land title and active land markets in the study area, the land
collateral (or credit supply) effect mentioned above is not dealt with in the
study.
Study area
Field data for testing allocative efficiency were gathered from eight villages in
the semi/arid zone of western Niger. A sample of 60 households was drawn
based on tenure status and manure use. Questions were posed about the
nature of households’ access to land, land use by individual family members,
manure management and physical attributes, agricultural practices and land
tenure history of major cereal fields.
The survey shows crop yields are generally low in the study villages. The
principal technique for maintaining soil fertility is the application of livestock
manure. Forty—three per cent of the fields are deliberately manured, either by
corralling animals on the ﬁeld during the dry season, or by carrying manure
from the household compound to the field.
Customary land tenure arrangements prevail in the study villages. Crop
production is carried out by individual households and land rights are
exclusive for the period of cultivation. Individual farmers can hold land in
one of three ways: i) as owned ﬁelds held permanently by families and their
descendants who are granted the right to use, modify and transfer land, and
the legitimate, but highly discouraged, right to sell; ii) as borrowed fields,
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held in security until the harvest, but reclaimed
by the owner afterwards; iii) as Fulfulde hawjou
fields in which land is borrowed from a pool of
community lands entrusted to the village chief.
Hawjou users have the same use rights as owners,
but cannot sell or lend the land directly to each
other. Both tenure systems provide ways of
reallocating land within the community.
Testing for transaction and
security effects
Two simple tests of allocative efficiency were
applied on the generated survey data to test
whether traditional land tenure systems allocate
land efficiently (transaction effect) and whether
tenure insecurity affects households’ manure
allocation (the security effect).
The test of the transaction effect rests on the
idea that if factor markets are efficient, then
returns to land should be equalised across
households and, thus, should not depend on a
household’s resource base. The test results
demonstrate that crop yields are strongly
inﬂuenced by manpower available to farming
households, a finding that contradicts allocative
efficiency. This implies that differences in land
endowments across households are not corrected
or equalised by land, labour and manure
transactions. Thus factor returns equalisation
fails to be achieved even though local land
tenure and labour institutions provide several
ways for the reallocation of factors among farms.
The test of the security effect investigates
the effects of particular land contracts and is
based on the idea that manure application is a
short'term investment in land. Under these
circumstances, if tenure security is not a farmer
concern, resources like manure that have a
lasting effect on soil quality should be allocated
across fields irrespective of tenure status. The
findings of this study indicate that tenure or
local customs allowing land sales appear to have
no effect on manuring. Nevertheless, the results
also show that borrowed fields are less manured
than owned fields. From this combined
evidence, it can be concluded that a change in
the land tenure system is not warranted, but that
the security of specific land tenure contracts
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inﬂuences investment in land fertility
improvements (e.g. manuring) when farmers can
choose among fields with different tenure
arrangements.
Future implications
This study provides robust evidence that tenure
insecurity incites farmers to divert scarce manure
resources to more secure fields whenever they can.
However, the study finds no evidence that local
laws and customs regarding the transferability of
land have an effect on short-term investment
decisions. It can be concluded from this that
security matters, but traditional tenure systems are
not in question. What is important is the regime
under which a particular field is farmed, i.e.
whether it is held permanently or temporarily.
The security of particular land contracts must not
be confused with the security of the land tenure
system as a whole.
The finding that returns to the three most
important agricultural inputs—land, labour and
manure—appear not to be equalised across farms
is more alarming. But this should not be
construed as an indictment of traditional land
tenure systems since it is doubtful that formal
markets for land and other factors of production
would totally eliminate allocative inefficiency.
Even if this were not the case, it remains unclear
if the establishment of land markets, land titling
and other measures would induce increased
investment, productivity or efficiency in an
environment of multiple market imperfections.
Further, the costs of establishing and managing
land titles may not be justified if the welfare loss
from current inefficiency is low. It is therefore
possible that current levels of allocative
efficiency exist because they do not generate
large welfare losses, an issue that needs to be
investigated through further research.
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